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I. INTRODUCTION
Two primary objectives of President Trump’s administration
are expanded religious freedom and strict immigration
enforcement. But many religiously motivated people are trying to
help vulnerable undocumented people with necessities. Is that a
crime?1 As executive officials continue to aggressively prosecute
immigration laws2 and at the same time promote a robust
understanding of religious freedom,3 a conflict is imminent
between a broad interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act’s (INA) § 1324 prohibition against harboring undocumented
people4 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).5 As the
Washington Post recently noted, the executive branch will be forced
to decide “what it prioritizes more: its ability to deport immigrants
in the country illegally—or the right of religious Americans to
stand in their way.”6 If executive officials decide to exercise their
discretion for a strict interpretation of the INA’s § 1324, courts will
be forced to address the conflict as well. This Article proposes
resolving the conflict by applying RFRA as a tool of statutory
construction, rather than on a case-by-case basis.

1. Elizabeth Eisenstadt Evans & Yonat Shimron, ‘Sanctuary Churches’ Vow to Shield
Immigrants from Trump Crackdown, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Nov. 21, 2016),
https://www.ncronline.org/news/politics/sanctuary-churches-vow-shield-immigrants
-trump-crackdown.
2. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of
Separating Migrant Families, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html.
3. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions on Federal Law Protections
for Religious Liberty (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release
/file/1001891/download.
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (criminalizes “any person who . . . knowing or
in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United
States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal,
harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any
means of transportation”).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (stating the federal “[g]overnment may [not]
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless it has a compelling governmental
interest and the means it chose to fulfill that compelling interest is the least restrictive means).
6. Phillip Bump, The Looming Conflict Between Trump’s Immigration Sweeps and
Religious Freedom, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/politics/wp/2017/02/12/the-looming-conflict-between-trumps-immigration
-sweeps-and-religious-freedom/?utm_term=.5b1671c672be.
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The standard tools of interpretation have failed to clarify the
harboring provision in § 1324 of the INA. Judges in the United
States Courts of Appeals have attempted to use traditional tools to
get clarity on the ambiguous provision, yet the ambiguity
remains—not just between circuits, but within some of them. In
some circuits, “harboring” under § 1324 is interpreted broadly,
including conduct that merely “substantially facilitates” or “makes
it easier or less difficult” for an undocumented person to stay in the
United States.7 In other circuits, the harboring provision is
interpreted narrowly requiring a specific intent to conceal the
undocumented person from authorities.8 Still others interpret the
harboring provision to mean giving an undocumented person “a
place to stay where it is unlikely that the authorities will be seeking
him.”9 This ambiguity creates a problem for the religiously
motivated people who are helping undocumented immigrants all
around the country by providing food, water, clothing, shelter, or
sanctuary.10 If the executive branch enforces the harboring
provision strictly, even against religiously motivated Americans,
what conduct is covered?
Consider United States v. Warren.11 The government is
criminally prosecuting Dr. Scott Daniel Warren, a professor at the
University of Arizona, for violating the § 1324 prohibition against
harboring illegal aliens.12 His crime? He “took care”13 of two
undocumented men who showed up at the door of No More

7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.B.
9. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 754 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States

v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012).
10. For purposes of this Article, “sanctuary” is defined as a nonclandestine form of
shelter. This is consistent with an understanding of the New Sanctuary Movement. For
example, see Myrna Orozco & Rev. Noel Andersen, Sanctuary in the Age of Trump:
The Rise of the Movement a Year into the Trump Administration, CHURCH WORLD SERV. (Jan.
2018), https://www.sanctuarynotdeportation.org/uploads/7/6/9/1/76912017/sanctuary
_in_the_age_of_trump_january_2018.pdf.
11. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
12. Grand Jury Indictment at 1–2, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807.
13. Complaint at 1, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807.
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Deaths,14 a religiously affiliated organization where he volunteers
by offering them “food, water, beds, and clean clothes.”15 In the
government’s view that is illegal—even though the government
presented no evidence that Dr. Warren concealed the
undocumented men from detection. In fact, it is arguable that by
caring for them at a facility known to provide humanitarian relief
for undocumented people, Warren helped the government locate
the men.16 What motivated Warren was his religious beliefs. He
said they “bound [me] to offer assistance to human beings in need
of basic necessities.”17
The last time the American legal system endured this
significant of a conflict between religiously motivated charitable
conduct and strict enforcement of immigration laws was in the
1980’s, in what became known as the Sanctuary Trials.18 The court
resolved that clash in a different religious freedom paradigm. The
analysis would almost certainly be different today given the new
religious freedom landscape that has taken shape because of RFRA
and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting and applying
RFRA in cases such as Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal19 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc.20 The analysis in this
new religious freedom landscape reveals a very strong RFRAbased claim or defense to a broad interpretation of harboring
under § 1324.
This Article argues for a RFRA-based statutory construction of
the INA’s harboring provision, which should influence
prosecutorial officials—and courts, if necessary—to minimize the
potential conflict between the two statutes. Moreover, resolving the
apparent tension between RFRA and the INA highlights a useful
starting point for re-examining the best way to fulfill RFRA’s
mandate. RFRA has traditionally been employed on a case-by-case
14. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 at 2–3, Warren, 2018 WL 5257807
[hereinafter Motion to Dismiss] (“No More Deaths is a ministry of the Unitarian Universalist
Church of Tucson . . . .”).
15. Complaint, supra note 13.
16. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 14, at 19.
17. Id. at 3.
18. For an overview of this conflict, see Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino,
Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1993).
19. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
20. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

111

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/13/19 3:35 AM

2019

exemption basis, but this Article proposes that using RFRA as a
prophylactic tool of construction is a better way to fulfill its
mandate when (1) the traditional tools have failed to interpret a
relevant statute, (2) the statute remains irreducibly ambiguous, and
(3) one interpretation would result in a large-scale RFRA infirmity.
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part I describes the
current confrontation between the executive branch and religious
communities. Each time the administration cracks down on
immigration enforcement, especially in traditionally sensitive
areas, religious communities respond with strong resistance. In
some cases, they even provide “sanctuary.” Part II demonstrates
how the INA’s harboring provision remains irreducibly ambiguous
even after courts have applied standard tools of interpretation. Part
III examines the recent paradigm shift in how conflicts between a
federal statute like the INA and religiously motivated conduct are
resolved and how the various interpretations of the harboring
provision may or may not survive under that new regime. Part IV
argues that, in construing statutes like the harboring provision,
using RFRA as a tool of statutory construction is better than using
RFRA on a case-by-case accommodation basis. Part V discusses
how to interpret the harboring provision using RFRA as a tool of
statutory construction.
II. THE EMERGING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELIGIOUS PEOPLE’S
ASSISTANCE TO VULNERABLE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
On February 8, 2017, a group of Latino men were leaving Rising
Hope Mission Church in Alexandria, Virginia, when they were
arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
and taken away in vans. Charles Haynes from the First
Amendment Center writes, “The church’s pastor . . . [is worried]
that ICE is now targeting churches . . . . ‘They are making people
fearful of coming to church,’ [Reverand Kerry] Kincannon told a
local TV station. . . . ‘[W]e are absolutely not going to stand for it.’”21

21. Charles C. Haynes, Opinion, Haynes: ‘Welcoming the Stranger’ in the Age of Trump,
PAHRUMP VALLEY TIMES (Mar. 2, 2017, 7:19 PM), https://pvtimes.com/opinion/hayneswelcoming-the-stranger-in-the-age-of-trump/.
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This resolution to stand against aggressive immigration
enforcement is shared by thousands of other religiously motivated
people and communities. Since President Trump took office in
2017, the number of churches offering sanctuary has doubled, from
about 400 in 2016 to more than 800 in 2017.22 The National Catholic
Reporter reports that “[t]he election of President Donald Trump
precipitated [an] outbreak of fear” in the immigration community.23
The Executive Director of the New Sanctuary Movement, Peter
Pedemonti, told the National Catholic Reporter that after the election
of Donald Trump, “[T]here’s been an ‘outpouring of inquiries and
support’ from congregations across the country that want to sign
on as sanctuary sites.”24 One Catholic Cardinal, in a February 28,
2017, letter, told priests and school officials in the archdiocese not
to allow federal agents onto church property without a warrant.25
Sacramento’s Roman Catholic Bishop told the press shortly after
the presidential election that if the administration attempted mass
deportations of undocumented immigrants, Catholic churches
would provide refuge: “[W]e have to be ready to respond if and
when that happens . . . ; [w]e will be true to our values as Catholics
and Americans.”26
While the Catholic Church has been one of the strongest critics
of President Trump’s signature policies to increase deportations,27
it is not the only faith group helping undocumented immigrants.
Many houses of worship are providing aid (and sometimes

22. Gabriella Borter, Under Trump, More Churches Offer Sanctuary but Few Seek Refuge,
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration
-sanctuary/under-trump-more-churches-offer-sanctuary-but-few-seek-refuge-idUSKBN1A
H350.
23. Peter Feuerherd, Churches Upfront About Legal Risks when Providing
Immigrants Sanctuary, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Sep. 21, 2017) https://www.ncronline.org
/news/parish/churches-upfront-about-legal-risks-when-providing-immigrants-sanctuary.
24. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1.
25. Catholic News Serv., Bishops’ Stances Vary on Sanctuary for Immigrants Facing
Deportation, CATH. PHILLY (Mar. 6, 2017), http://catholicphilly.com/2017/03/news
/national-news/bishops-stances-vary-on-sanctuary-for-immigrants-facing-deportation/.
26. Stephen Magagnini, Churches Could Offer Sanctuary from Mass Deportations, Says
Sacramento Bishop, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 2, 2017, 9:09 AM), https://www.sacbee.com
/news/local/article135865728.html.
27. Christopher White, Immigrants Are Seeking Sanctuary in U.S. Churches, CRUX (Mar.
30, 2017), https://cruxnow.com/interviews/2017/03/30/immigrants-seeking-sanctuary-u
-s-churches/.
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sanctuary), including those of the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish
faiths.28 Jennifer Piper, who works as the Interfaith Organizing
Director for Immigrant Rights at American Friends Service
Committee, responded to a media question regarding how her
work has changed under the Trump administration with the
following: “We are receiving overwhelming requests to lead
workshops, as faith communities are disturbed by the
dehumanizing rhetoric of the current Administration and the
potential for indiscriminate separation of families.”29
Such religiously motivated resistance, however, has not slowed
the President’s aggressive agenda to “take the shackles off” ICE.30
According to the National Catholic Reporter, between February 1,
2017, and July 31, 2017, orders of removal and voluntary departure
have increased 30.9%.31 A month before the aforementioned raid
outside Rising Hope Mission Church, the President signed an
executive order entitled “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of
the United States,” which the American Immigration Council (AIC)
described as a “massive expansion of interior immigration
enforcement.”32 According to AIC, the order “defines enforcement
priorities so broadly as to place all unauthorized individuals at risk
of deportation, including families, long-time residents, and
‘Dreamers.’”33 And even though there is a specific policy outlined
in the Morton Memo of July 2011 that identifies churches as
“sensitive locations” protected from ICE enforcement, barring

28. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1; Kimberly Winston, Ohio Mosque is First to Join
Sanctuary Movement, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.ncronline.org
/news/politics/ohio-mosque-first-join-sanctuary-movement.
29. White, supra note 27.
30. Nick Miroff & Maria Sacchetti, Trump Takes ‘Shackles’ Off ICE, Which is Slapping
Them on Immigrants Who Thought They Were Safe, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-takes-shackles-off
-ice-which-is-slapping-them-on-immigrants-who-thought-they-were-safe/2018/02/11/4bd
5c164-083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html?utm_term=.ea234175a8be.
31. Feuerherd, supra note 23.
32. Summary of Executive Order “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United
States”, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1, 1 (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org
/sites/default/files/research/summary_of_executive_order_enhancing_public_safety_in_
the_interior_of_the_united_states.pdf.
33. Id.
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emergency circumstances,34 immigration lawyers and watchers
have called into question the administration’s fidelity to that policy,
especially given recent raids in sensitive locations, such as the one
at Rising Hope. Moreover, United States v. Warren illustrates that
executive officials are including religiously motivated Americans
in their immigration enforcement priorities.
This confusion has created a problem both for the religiously
motivated people providing aid to undocumented people and for
the government. As the National Latino Evangelical Coalition
stated, “Churches need to follow their conscience. . . . If they feel
the need to protect undocumented immigrants, they’re within their
biblical and theological right to do so.”35 If it is clear to the churches
that they are within their biblical right to do so, it is less clear to
them whether they are within their legal right to do so. The Catholic
Philly reported that the Catholic community is torn over what to do
about the uptick in deportation enforcement because their
attorneys have questioned whether they can legally offer
sanctuary.36 The National Catholic Reporter documented Jesuit
Father Bryan Pham, a canon and civil lawyer and professor at
Marymount University in Los Angeles, urging Catholic institutions
to be cautious of the potential consequences for giving sanctuary:
“It’s a prophetic stance . . . but there’s no legal defense.”37 Jennifer
Piper from American Friends Service Committee, however,
disagrees: “[C]hurches are not breaking laws against ‘harboring
aliens’ because they are open about which immigrants they have
taken in, and where.”38

34. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June
17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion
-memo.pdf [hereinafter Morton Memo]; FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (last updated Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.ice.gov
/ero/enforcement/sensitive-loc (defining “sensitive locations”).
35. Evans & Shimron, supra note 1.
36. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 182 n.380.
37. Feuerherd, supra note 23.
38. Rachel Estabrook, What Makes a Church a Sanctuary for Undocumented Immigrants?,
COLO. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/inside-colorados
-church-movement-to-protect-immigrants-due-for-deportation.
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III. THE HARBORING PROVISION IN THE INA
IS IRREDUCIBLY AMBIGUOUS
The federal courts, like the churches discussed previously, are
divided about whether harboring includes providing mere shelter
or whether it is limited to clandestine sheltering.39 The relevant
portion of the statute makes it a federal felony for any person to
knowing[ly] or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of
law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to
conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place,
including any building or any means of transportation . . . . 40

Recent cases have brought some clarity to a few circuits, but
federal courts remain divided about how broadly to interpret this
criminal provision of the INA. One scholar notes:
The anti-harboring provision, however, is quite special. Its
language presents enormous interpretative problems, most
obviously in its use of the term “harbor.” How should this
uncommon word be read? The Supreme Court, in its only
encounter with the problem in this context, openly admitted it
was stumped. The Second Circuit was likewise frustrated in its
attempt to construe the anti-harboring statute in Lopez. “Our task
would have been lightened,” the court noted dryly, “if Congress
had expressly defined the word ‘harbor.’”41

This criminal offense is punishable by a large fine or
imprisonment and applies to all persons—not just those engaged in
transporting undocumented people into the United States and not
just those who are motivated by financial gain.42 Despite the
severity of the offense and ambiguity over what conduct it covers,
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a uniform definition of
harboring, nor has Congress elaborated on its meaning. As a result,
courts have tried to construe the § 1324 prohibition using

39. SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, 3 IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE 2D § 17:56
(2d ed. 2018).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (emphasis added).
41. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 143 (footnote omitted).
42. See § 1324(a)(1)(B).
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traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Yet the ambiguity
remains.
Even though a survey of the legislative history, congressional
intent, or textual understanding of the harboring provision43 is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to this Article’s
broader argument concerning RFRA to note that, even when these
interpretative tools are employed, the ambiguity remains. For
example, one court considered the provision’s plain meaning and
found it to be clearly “directed against those who abet evaders of
the law against unlawful entry, as the collocation of ‘conceal’ and
‘harbor’ shows. Indeed, the word ‘harbor’ alone often connotes
surreptitious concealment.”44 The same circuit, however, later
found the provision’s plain meaning less clear: “We do not think
the ordinary meaning of ‘harbors,’ at least with respect to
whether it entails avoiding detection, is unambiguous. While
‘harbor’ may sometimes be synonymous with ‘shelter,’ many of its
most common uses—for example, ‘harboring a fugitive’—also
connote concealment.”45
Dictionaries and modern internet searches have not proved
helpful, either. One court noted, “Dictionaries, either from the
early twentieth century or today, do not consistently define
‘harbor’ as containing or lacking an element of concealment.”46
Another court relied on the 1910 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary,
which states that “a person may be convicted of harboring a slave,
although he may not have concealed her.”47 But another judge on
the panel resorted to a Google search and found it “apparent from
[the] results that ‘harboring,’ as the word is actually used, has a
connotation—which ‘sheltering’ and a fortiori ‘giving a person a

43. See, e.g., Emily Breslin, The Road to Liability is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions:
Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(A)(1)(A)(III),
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 214 (2009); Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement and Harboring
Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147 (2010); Loken & Bambino, supra note 18; see also United
States v. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040
(7th Cir. 2012).
44. Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 380 (citing United States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290, 291 (2d
Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.)).
45. Id. at 381.
46. Id.
47. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1043.
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place to stay’—does not, of deliberately safeguarding members of
a specified group from authorities . . . .”48
Even after considering the placement and structure of the term
in the statute, it is still unclear what the harboring provision means.
One court found the placement to suggest that it was
intended to encompass an element of concealment . . . The other
two terms—’conceals’ and ‘shields from detection’—both carry an
obvious connotation of secrecy and hiding. The canon of noscitur
a sociis would thus suggest that ‘harbors,’ as the third and only
other term . . . also shares this connotation . . . .49

But another court found this meant the exact opposite, stating, “We
needn’t assume that harboring is redundant; it can be given a
meaning that plugs a possible loophole left open by merely
forbidding concealing and shielding from detection.”50 This same
court noted that “[w]hen a statute is broadly worded in order to
prevent loopholes from being drilled in it by ingenious lawyers,
there is a danger of its being applied to situations absurdly remote
from the concerns of the statute’s framers.”51
This ambiguity in the meaning of “harboring” is not resolved
by any of the major theoretical approaches to statutory
interpretation. Plain meaning textualists would seek to resolve the
ambiguity by looking to context, but each of the alternative
readings is consistent with § 1324 as a whole: this is not a situation
where only one of the alternative meanings of a statutory term
makes sense in light of surrounding provisions. Nor does
purposivism provide a clear resolution of the ambiguity. Both wide
and narrow readings of “harboring” are consistent with the
purposes that a reasonable legislature could have had in enacting
§ 1324. Finally, an approach to statutory interpretation that focuses
on the intent of Congress fails to clarify the ambiguity. As is
frequently the case, the legislative history does not address the
question adequately.52

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1044.
Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 381.
Costello, 666 F.3d at 1045.
Id. at 1046 (quoting Abbot Labs. v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 476 F.3d 421, 426 (7th
Cir. 2007)).
52. For a more fulsome discussion of the legislative history, see Loken & Babino, supra
note 18, at 143, and also, generally Breslin supra note 43, and Jain, supra note 43.
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In sum, “harboring” is irreducibly ambiguous as a matter of
statutory interpretation from the perspective of textualism,
purposivism, and intentionalism. This backdrop of irreducible
ambiguity permits utilizing RFRA as a tool of construction to
narrowly interpret the statute. For purposes of this Article, I have
categorized the ambiguity in the circuits into three interpretations:
a) harboring as merely substantial facilitation, b) harboring as
substantially facilitating plus evading detection from the
authorities, and c) harboring as providing a person “a place to stay
that the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him.”53
A. The Broadest Interpretation of “Harboring” Includes Mere
“Substantial Facilitation” of an Undocumented Person’s
Ability to Stay in the Country
The broadest interpretation of the harboring provision includes
conduct that “tends to substantially facilitate” an undocumented
alien remaining in the United States, regardless of whether the
defendant intended to conceal the alien from authorities.54 For
example, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Sanchez that a
couple who had rented an apartment for undocumented aliens and
promised to help them obtain work and immigration papers were
guilty under the harboring provision.55 Likewise, in United States v.
Rushing and United States v. Tipton, the Eighth Circuit held that
convictions for harboring were sufficiently supported where the
defendants helped the undocumented persons obtain work and a
place to live, even if the defendants did not intend to hide them.56
For decades, the Fifth Circuit held the same broad view about
what constitutes harboring.57 This view can be summarized by
United States v. Balderas, where the court ruled that “affording
53. See United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 2015).
54. See United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (defining “substantially

facilitate” to mean making the undocumented person’s stay in the United States “easier or
less difficult”).
55. United States v. Sanchez, 927 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1991).
56. United States v. Tipton, 518 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rushing, 313
F.3d 428 (8th Cir. 2002), judgement vacated (Jan. 14, 2003).
57. See, e.g., Shum, 496 F.3d at 390; United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F. 3d 154 (5th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Valerio-Santibanez, 81 F. App’x. 836 (5th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Rubio-Gonzales, 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th
Cir. 1977).
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shelter to an illegal alien is conduct which by its nature tends to
substantially facilitate the alien’s remaining in the United States . . . .”58
This view that mere sheltering amounts to harboring maintains that
Congress intended to broadly proscribe conduct that makes it
“easier or less difficult”59 for undocumented people to remain in
the United States, regardless of a specific intent to prevent the
undocumented person from being detected. The Fifth Circuit,
however, may have recently signaled a changing viewpoint. In
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, the court
acknowledged that Congress “intended to broadly proscribe any
knowing or willful conduct fairly within any of these terms that
tends to substantially facilitate an alien’s remaining in the United
States illegally[,]”60 but ultimately went in seemingly the opposite
direction, concluding, “To that end, we have interpreted the
statutory phrase ‘harbor, shield, or conceal’ to imply that
‘something is being hidden from detection.”61
Likewise, in the Ninth Circuit, after decades of finding
harboring to include substantial facilitation, a similar shift in
viewpoint may be occurring. In two prominent cases, United States
v. Acosta de Evans62 and United States v. Aguilar,63 the court held that
mere provision of shelter could violate the harboring provision. In
Acosta de Evans, the defendant provided housing to undocumented
family and friends but argued at trial that she did not intend or try
to hide them from authorities.64 The court rejected her argument
and held that her mere provision of shelter was harboring.65 More
than a decade later, in the Sanctuary Trials, the court held that
harboring an unlawful alien does not require an intent to evade
authorities (even though the court went on to find that it was what
the defendants were in fact doing).66 The court stated:

58. United States v. Balderas, 91 F. App’x 354, 354 (5th Cir. 2004).
59. Shum, 496 F.3d at 392.
60. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524, 529 (5th

Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1073 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982)).
61. Id. (quoting United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1981)).
62. United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1976).
63. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
64. Acosta, 531 F.2d at 429.
65. Id. at 430.
66. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 689–90.
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In United States v. Acosta de Evans, this court rejected the very claim
that appellants are making in this case. The court examined the
legislative history of § 1324(a) and case law from other circuits
that already addressed the issue, concluding that the word
‘harbor’ means ‘to afford shelter to’ and does not require an intent
to avoid detection.67

Although these two prominent cases have not been overruled, it
appears the Ninth Circuit may be signaling a change in its view
about whether a specific intent to help the undocumented person
evade detection is required as an element of harboring. For instance,
in United States v. You, the court held that the jurors were properly
instructed regarding § 1324(a) when they were told they “must find
that Appellants had acted with ‘the purpose of avoiding the aliens’
detection by immigration authorities.”68 Likewise, in United States v.
Latysheva, the court held “harboring of [undocumented] aliens under
8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), is a specific intent crime . . . .”69 It is
unclear in the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits whether harboring under
§ 1324 requires an intent to conceal an undocumented person and
not merely substantially facilitating the presence of undocumented
people. The same ambiguity existed in the Second Circuit until
United States v. George70 was decided in 2015. I discuss George in
further detail in my discussion of the narrowest interpretation of the
harboring provision.
B. The Narrowest Interpretation of “Harboring” Requires “Substantial
Facilitation” Plus Preventing Authorities from Detecting the
Undocumented Individual’s Presence
The second way courts have tended to interpret
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) is to find that harboring not only requires
substantially facilitating an undocumented person’s stay in the
country, but also a specific intent to help the undocumented person
evade detection from authorities.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 690 (citation omitted).
United States v. You, 382 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original).
United States v. Latysheva, 162 F. App’x. 720, 727 (9th Cir. 2006).
United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2015). George was not an en banc
decision. Id.
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The Second Circuit followed this approach in a 2015 case called
United States v. George.71 After acknowledging the decades of
ambiguity on how to interpret the provision,72 the court held that
although the government must show the defendant shielded the
alien from detection or discovery from authorities, it does not have
to show that the defendant acted secretly or that the hiding was
necessarily clandestine.73
“A defendant who intends to conceal an illegal alien from
authorities may be guilty of harboring,” it explained, “even though
his conduct ‘lack[s] the hallmarks of active, classic concealment.’”74
As a result, when the defendant in George argued that “she never
hid the [immigrant] from visitors nor restricted her movements or
mistreated her in any way,”75 the court responded that harboring
requires proof only that the defendant sheltered the immigrant
“intending to make the alien’s ‘detection by the authorities
substantially more difficult.’”76 Citing Vargas-Cordon, the George
court reiterated its previous holding that “where a defendant’s
conduct ‘undoubtedly diminished the government’s ability to
locate’ an illegal alien, he was guilty of harboring even if he ‘did not
actively hide the alien from the outside world.’”77
The Sixth Circuit takes a slightly different approach. It has held
that preventing detection from authorities requires some level of
clandestine behavior. Harboring occurs, in its view, where the
defendants “clandestinely shelter, succor and protect improperly
admitted aliens” and conceal them by “shielding [them] from

71. Id.
72. Id. at 117.
73. Id. at 118.

The George Court said that, prior to its 2013 decision in Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d 366
(2d Cir. 2013), its precedents lacked consistency in construing the harboring provision.
George, 779 F.3d at 118. So it tried to provide clarity by making clear that Vargas-Cordon
settled the debate in the Second Circuit that a “defendant’s action must be intended [to not
only] (1) substantially . . . facilitate an illegal alien’s remaining in the United States, [but also]
(2) . . . prevent the alien’s detection by immigration authorities . . . .” Id.
74. Id. at 119 (quoting Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382) (alteration in original); see also
Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382 (“[E]ven if Vargas-Cordon’s conduct lacked the hallmarks of
active, classic concealment, it nevertheless was intended to make [the undocumented
immigrant’s] detection by the authorities substantially more difficult.”).
75. George, 779 F.3d at 121.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id. (citing Vargas-Cordon, 733 F.3d at 382).
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observation and preventing [their] discovery.”78 As one court
recently put it, clandestinely implies that harboring includes the
“intent to assist the alien’s attempt to evade or avoid detection by
law enforcement.”79 The addition of clandestine behavior separates
the Sixth Circuit from the Ninth, Second, or Fifth Circuits by adding
an additional specific intent that is harder to prove and adds
protection for those providing aid to undocumented immigrants.80
Similarly, the Third Circuit found no harboring when the
government failed to provide sufficient evidence that a woman
cohabitating with her undocumented boyfriend attempted to
actively hide him from the authorities.81 “Reasonable control of the
premises,” the court explained, “is not an element of ‘harboring’
under § 1324. Rather, the government had to prove that Silveus’s
‘conduct tend[ed] substantially to facilitate [the alien’s] remaining
in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities
from detecting his unlawful presence.”82
The Third Circuit also reversed the conviction of a defendant
who had done nothing other than provide general advice to an
undocumented alien, such as saying to “lay low,” “[d]isappear,
don’t tell anyone what address you’re staying at.”83 The court noted
that while the legislative history of § 1324 “suggested that Congress
intended to strengthen the law in ‘preventing aliens from entering
or remaining in the United States illegally,’” the court had “found
no cases in which a defendant [had] been convicted under this
statute for merely giving an alien advice to lay low and to stay away
from the address on file with INS, obvious information that any
fugitive would know.”84 The Third Circuit appears to think that
78. Susnjar v. United States, 27 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1928).
79. See United States. v. Belevin-Ramales, 458 F. Supp. 2d 409, 410–11 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
80. Thus, it is unclear whether the Ninth, Second or Fifth Circuits hold that the

‘government does not have to prove that the Defendant harbored the alien with
the intent to assist the alien’s attempt to evade or avoid detection by law
enforcement’ as provided in the government’s proposed jury instructions. In
contrast, in Susnjar, the Sixth Circuit clearly stated that the word ‘harbor’ means
to ‘clandestinely shelter, succor and protect improperly admitted aliens.’ When an
act is done ‘clandestinely’ it is done secretly or in hiding.
Id. at 410–11 (citations omitted).
81. See United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1003–04 (3d Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 1004.
83. United States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 100 (3d Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 98–99.
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holding defendants criminally liable for low level facilitating of
undocumented aliens “would effectively write the word
‘substantially’ out of the test we have undertaken to apply.”85
Along these same lines, it recently emphasized that “‘harboring’
requires some act of obstruction that reduces the likelihood the
government will discover the alien’s presence.”86 That is more than
substantially facilitating.
The Eleventh Circuit articulated a similar interpretation in
United States v. Dominguez,87 where it reversed the defendants’
harboring convictions because the defendants had not substantially
facilitated the aliens’ “escaping detection from immigration
officials.”88 The court noted that the defendants took the aliens to
“experienced immigration counsel shortly after they arrived to
process them through immigration, and the [aliens] in no way
engaged in conduct suggesting that they were hiding from or
otherwise avoiding immigration officials.”89
In summary, under the narrowest interpretation of the
harboring provision, courts not only emphasize that the facilitation
must be substantial, they require specific intent to help the
undocumented person evade detection by authorities. In some
courts, this additional element requires clandestine hiding; in
others, it does not. In some courts, it means helping the migrant
escape detection; in others, it is merely obstructing the immigration
authorities from detecting them. In all these circuits, however,
something more than merely providing shelter is required.

85. Id. at 101; see also DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir.
2012); United States v. Cuevas-Reyes, 572 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009).
86. DelRio-Mocci, 672 F.3d at 246 (citing Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 223
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated on other grounds, 563 U.S. 1030).
87. United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051 (11th Cir. 2011).
88. Id. at 1063.
89. Id.
Hiding, however, does not necessarily require a physical barrier. For example,
where defendant employers paid in cash and falsified social security numbers, an Eleventh
Circuit court found that enough evidence existed for a successful conviction of harboring
under § 1324. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010).
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C. The Middle-of-the-Road Interpretation Is that “Harboring” Requires
Providing a Person “a Place to Stay in Which the
Authorities Are Unlikely to Be Seeking Him”
A third interpretation appears as a middle ground. It is best
described as requiring something more than “substantial
facilitation,” but less than a specific intent to conceal the
undocumented person from authorities. The Seventh Circuit took
this position in United States v. McClellan.90 Relying on a previous
Seventh Circuit decision called United States v. Costello, the
defendant argued that, because he did not shield the
undocumented person from authorities, he did not harbor them.
The court, however, disagreed, and distinguished Costello. In
Costello, the defendant was romantically involved with the man she
knew was an undocumented alien. The McClellan court notes this
fact: “We, however, rejected the idea that harboring included
‘letting your boyfriend live with you.’”91
McClellan was not romantically cohabitating with an
undocumented alien. Instead he was employing undocumented
aliens and providing them “housing to help compensate them for
the otherwise low wages that he was paying them.”92 Yet, even in
deciding against the defendant, the Seventh Circuit failed to resolve
the issue of what constitutes harboring. It appears that “letting your
[undocumented] boyfriend live with you” does not constitute
harboring but giving a person a certain kind of shelter without an
intent to hide them might. One Seventh Circuit judge articulated
his interpretation of the provision as:
The terms ‘conceal,’ ‘harbor,’ and ‘shield from detection’ have
independent meanings, and thus a conviction can result from
committing (or attempting to commit) any one of the three acts.
These terms are not defined in the statute, and courts have
90. United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2015). See the McClellan
Court’s characterization of United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2012):
He maintains that Costello “reject[ed] the premise that ‘harboring’ can be equated
to ‘simple shelter in the sense of just providing a place to stay.’” He submits that,
because he did not take ‘any actions for the purpose of shielding the illegal aliens
from law enforcement detection,’ his convictions under § 1324 cannot stand.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 750.

125

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/13/19 3:35 AM

2019

devoted substantial effort to pinning down their precise meanings
in the context of the harboring statute . . . “and the office left to
‘harboring’ is, then, materially to assist an alien to remain illegally
in the United States without publicly advertising his presence but
without needing or bothering to conceal it.”93

In Costello, Judge Posner specifically pointed out that “harboring
could involve advertising, for instance if a church publicly offered
sanctuary for illegal aliens and committed to resist any effort by the
authorities to enter the church’s premises to arrest them.”94
When the McClellan court distinguished Costello it explained,
“In striving to define harboring, we observed that ‘harboring as the
word is actually used has a connotation . . . of deliberately
safeguarding members of a specified group from the authorities,
whether through concealment, movement to a safe location, or
physical protection.’”95 The court reasoned that the harboring
provision “should be seen as ‘plug[ging] a possible loophole left
open by merely forbidding concealing and shielding from
detection.’”96 It then rests on an interpretation of harboring as
“providing . . . a known illegal alien a secure haven, a refuge, a
place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be seeking
him.”97 The court emphasized that this interpretation is founded on
their understanding that the essence of harboring is a “decision to
provide a refuge for an illegal alien because he’s an illegal alien.”98
While it remains opaque, this middle-of-the-road interpretation
appears to require less than specific intent to conceal the alien or
prevent their detection from authorities.99 But it also appears to
require more than merely substantially facilitating an
undocumented person’s ability to stay in the country.100 Moreover,

93. United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556, 569 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Costello, 666
F.3d at 1046–47).
94. Costello, 666 F.3d at 1047 (emphasis in original).
95. McClellan, 794 F.3d at 749 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044).
96. Id. (citing Costello, 666 F.3d at 1045).
97. Id. at 749–50 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050).
98. Id. at 749 (quoting Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044).
99. But see Costello, 666 F.3d at 1048 (“So concealment (‘clandestinely shelter’) is an
element of harboring.”).
100. McClellan, 794 F.3d at 751.
[I]f our statement in Costello were not sufficiently clear, we hold that, when the
basis for the defendant’s conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) is providing housing

126

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

107

8/13/19 3:35 AM

Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA

there are two more reasons this middle-of-the-road interpretation
remains ambiguous. First, until McClellan in 2015, the Seventh
Circuit held there was not a specific intent requirement for a
violation of § 1324.101 Secondly, as recently as 2009, the Seventh
Circuit held in United States v. Ye that the language “conduct
tending substantially to facilitate,” which originated in the Second
Circuit,102 was unwelcome in the Seventh Circuit.103 The Seventh
Circuit has still not cleared up what specific conduct is covered by
the harboring provision.
This lack of clarity within and between the federal circuits
regarding how to interpret the harboring provision is important to
the religiously motivated people described in Part I. Depending on
how broadly or narrowly the harboring provision is interpreted,
the religiously motivated conduct of churches could be implicated.
Moreover, just as there is a spectrum of interpretations for the
harboring provision, there is also a spectrum of pertinent
to a known illegal alien, there must be evidence from which a jury could conclude,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to safeguard that alien
from the authorities. Such intent can be established by showing that the defendant
has taken actions to conceal an alien by moving the alien to a hidden location or
providing physical protection to the alien.
Id.
101. Id. at 755.

Indeed, we noted on more than one occasion in Li that there was no law from this
circuit holding that § 1324 incorporates a specific intent requirement and,
relatedly, no circuit law requiring a specific intent instruction. We also observed
that counsel’s general intent instruction was consistent with the approach of
several other circuits.
Id.
102. See United States v. Lopez, 521 F.2d 437, 441 (2d Cir. 1975).
103. United States v. Ye, 588 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Because we decline to import

that statutory interpretation into the law of this Circuit, we conclude that the district court’s
supplemental jury instruction was not erroneous.” (footnote omitted)). The court further
noted:
Whether that conduct ’tends substantially‘ to assist an alien is irrelevant, for the
statute requires no specific quantum or degree of assistance.
Congress could not have been clearer: it said that concealing, harboring, or
shielding from detection an alien is unlawful conduct, regardless of how effective
a defendant’s efforts to help the alien might tend to be. If a person commits a
relatively nominal act that is proscribed by § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), the executive
branch has the discretion to forego prosecution. Courts’ overlaying the statute
with the ’tending substantially‘ veneer appropriates that discretion and also
invades the province of Congress by de-criminalizing lesser forms of conduct
—i.e., actions that only ’tend slightly or moderately‘ to help an alien.
Id. at 416.
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religiously motivated conduct. On one end of the spectrum is the
church or person that does nothing more than shelter people
regardless of their status—for instance, a hypothermia shelter that
provides free shelter and knowingly includes undocumented
immigrants in their population. It is plausible in some circuits that
this behavior could constitute a criminal violation of harboring. On
the other end of the spectrum is a church that is openly providing
“sanctuary” to an undocumented person, such as the church
featured on the cover of the Washington Post on March 31, 2018.104
That church, the United Methodist Church of Mancos in Colorado,
is offering sanctuary to Rosa Sabido, an undocumented woman
who has lived in the United States for thirty years.105 This would
almost certainly constitute harboring in some circuits.
IV. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL STATUTES AND
RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT UNDER THE RFRA REGIME
Given the increased efforts by religiously motivated people to
resist a “zero-tolerance”106 immigration policy, and the unresolved
ambiguity in the federal circuits regarding interpreting the INA’s
§ 1324, it is not hard to foresee a conflict between the harboring
provision and religiously motivated conduct towards the
undocumented alien. This is not the first time, however, that the
executive branch has had to deal with a conflict between its
immigration policies and resistance from religious communities. In
the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s immigration policy in Central
America was strongly resisted by religious communities who called
themselves the “Sanctuary Movement.”107 Gregory Loken and Lisa
Bambino recount the story of Maria Aguilar, the woman whose

104. Stephanie McCrummen, A Sanctuary of One, WASH. POST, (Mar. 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/03/31/feature/after-30
-years-in-america-she-was-about-to-be-deported-then-a-tiny-colorado-church-offered-her
-sanctuary/?utm_term=.6613fb9c4e69.
105. Id.; see also Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 141 (“The broadest contingent of
sanctuary churches and workers have been engaged in the reactive, non-clandestine shelter
of the undocumented.”).
106. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (April 6, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry.
107. See generally, ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY: A STORY OF AMERICAN CONSCIENCE
AND THE LAW IN COLLISION (1988).
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name would become famous as one of the defendants in the
Sanctuary Trials of the 1980s:
Maria, a graying, recently widowed woman of fifty-seven,
knelt to say the rosary. No doubt she needed the spiritual strength
it provided, for her house was full of destitute foreigners sent to
her by her parish priest. Beside her was a man named Jesús, who
joined in her prayer. According to the ancient forms, they would
introduce each decade of Hail Mary’s with the Lord’s Prayer and
the words “Thy kingdom come.” They would conclude by
addressing the Virgin Mary: “To thee do we cry, poor banished
children of Eve; to thee do we send up our sighs, mourning and
weeping in this valley of tears.” Yet while they spoke the same
words, their motivations could not have been more contrary:
Maria del Socorro Pardo de Aguilar believed it her duty to shelter
those whom civil war had banished from their homeland; Jesús
Cruz was attempting to prove Mrs. Aguilar guilty of a federal
crime for acting on that belief.108

Several years later, Maria Aguilar and seven other religious
workers were prosecuted under § 1324’s harboring provision109 and
convicted of federal felonies for acting on their religious beliefs.110
Yet, the Sanctuary Movement persisted.111
The Sanctuary Trials of the 1980s revealed that, under the
former religious freedom paradigm, a religious defense to
harboring an undocumented person was weak. A legal memo
written on October 31, 1983, by Ted Olson, then the Assistant
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, said that
“[p]roviding church sanctuary to illegal aliens probably violates 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3), which forbids the harboring of illegal aliens.”112
The memo continued,
Courts are unlikely to recognize church sanctuary as legally
justified under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
because disagreement with the government’s treatment of aliens

108. Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 119.
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C) (2012) is the successor under the Immigration Control and

Reform Act of 1986 to the anti-harboring provision applicable to the Aguilar defendants.
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
110. Aguilar, 883 F. 2d at 709.
111. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 18, at 121–22.
112. Church Sanctuary for Illegal Aliens, 7 Op. O.L.C. 168, 168 (1983).
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is not a religious belief that is burdened by enforcement of the
immigration laws, and the government has a compelling
countervailing interest in uniform law enforcement.113

Olson concluded, “[t]he integrity of our government would be
seriously threatened if individuals could escape the criminal law by
pleading religious necessity.”114
Since the Sanctuary Trials, however, a dramatic shift has
occurred in religious freedom law, with the 1993 Federal RFRA,
and Supreme Court cases applying RFRA, such as Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006)115 and, perhaps
most importantly, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014).116 This
change in the religious freedom landscape creates a viable religious
defense to the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision
(conduct that merely “substantially facilitates”).
“Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to provide very broad
protection for religious liberty.”117 It states:
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
(c) Judicial relief

113. Id.
114. Id. at 171.
115. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 420

(2006).
116. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693 (2014).
117. Id.

130

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

107

8/13/19 3:35 AM

Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to
assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
governed by the general rules of standing under article III
of the Constitution.118

In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court stated, “By enacting RFRA,
Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is
constitutionally required.”119 RFRA requires the government to
not substantially burden a person’s religious exercise unless the
government can show a compelling interest and that it is
implemented in the least restrictive means. The next three sections
analyze each of the three previously outlined harboring
interpretations under the new religious freedom paradigm
created by RFRA (and the Supreme Court’s RFRA jurisprudence),
showing that there is a viable RFRA claim or defense to at least
the broadest interpretation.
A. A “Substantial Burden on a Person’s Religious Exercise” Will Be
Demonstrated Under All Interpretations of the Harboring Provision
During the Sanctuary Trials, the government brought in socalled experts120 to testify to the centrality of the religious beliefs at
issue.121 These experts testified that helping an immigrant flee
persecution by offering them sanctuary was not central to the
Christian faith.122 Persuaded by the experts’ testimony, the court
found that the defendant’s religious beliefs were not substantially
burdened because the beliefs were not mandated or central.123
Specifically, the court noted that the defendants could have found
other ways to express their faith.124

118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (2000).
119. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 at 706.
120. See generally, WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS

FREEDOM xxii–xxv (new ed. 2018).
121. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694 (9th Cir. 1989).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.

131

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/13/19 3:35 AM

2019

RFRA as amended, however, says that it covers “any exercise
of religion whether or not compelled [by] or central . . . .”125
Moreover, Congress mandated that RFRA “be construed in favor
of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent
permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”126 In
Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that this broad deference regarding
what constitutes a religious belief is found both in the Court’s Free
Exercise jurisprudence (citing previous decisions such as
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith
(Employment Division v. Smith)127) and RFRA itself:
RFRA’s question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial
burden on the objecting parties’ . . . with their religious beliefs. . . .
It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs of the
plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable. . . . The Court’s “narrow
function . . . is to determine” whether the plaintiffs’ asserted
religious belief reflects “an honest conviction . . . .”128

The Supreme Court was clear that it is not the province of the
judiciary to determine whether a religious belief is flawed,
plausible, mistaken, substantial, or reasonable.129

First, the court was unconvinced that section 1324 unduly burdened defendants’
free exercise of religion, noting: “Representatives of Catholic and Methodist clergy
testified at the pretrial hearing and trial. None suggested that devout Christian
belief mandates participation in the ‘sanctuary movement.’ Obviously,
[defendants] could have assisted beleaguered El Salvadorans in many ways which
did not affront border control laws . . . .”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 956 (5th Cir. 1986)).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
126. Id. § 2000cc-3(g); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 684
(2014) (“First, nothing in RFRA as originally enacted suggested that its definition of ‘exercise
of religion’ was meant to be tied to pre-Smith interpretations of the First Amendment.
Second, if RFRA’s original text were not clear enough, the RLUIPA amendment surely
dispels any doubt that Congress intended to separate the definition of the phrase from that
in First Amendment case law.”).
127. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
128. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 686.
129. Id. at 724–25; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts,
we have warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a religious
claim.”); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“[I]t
is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not
undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with
his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a
more sophisticated person might employ.”).
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For a successful defense based on RFRA, however, it must also
be proven that, whatever the religious belief, it was substantially
burdened. First, a violation of § 1324 is a criminal felony.130 That
alone would likely prove a substantial burden. Secondly,
however, the punishment for each count of violating § 1324 comes
with a maximum of a $10,000 fine plus five years in prison,131 as
well as the potential for forfeiture of property. For violations of
§ 1324 committed for commercial or economic gain, the
punishments are higher.132
Regardless of which interpretation of the harboring provision
is used, the new religious freedom paradigm no longer allows
judicial testing of the centrality of a person’s religious beliefs as it
did in the old paradigm. Furthermore, because violating § 1324 is a
criminal offense and the punishment is grave, this first RFRA
element of a “substantial burden on religious belief” will likely be
met under all the interpretations.
B. Under a Broad Interpretation of the Harboring Provision,
the Government Will Not Be Able to Show
a Sufficiently Compelling Interest
When the defendants in the 1980s Sanctuary Trials invoked
their Free Exercise Clause defense, they came up against a
powerful, categorical “overriding” governmental interest.133 The
court found that the government’s power to regulate immigration
was so compelling that it trumped any religiously motivated
conduct.134 A major paradigm shift, however, is being born in the
way the Court thinks about the federal power to regulate
immigration. This paradigm shift in immigration law is important
because it submits the government’s power in immigration to
scrutiny by the judiciary in new ways.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

8 U.S.C. § 1324(B)(i)–(iv) (2012).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 695 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id.; see also United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986).
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1. The government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws is not as
categorically exceptional as it once was
It is well-known that the federal government has strong power
to regulate its borders.135 As one scholar noted, in the former
immigration law paradigm, “constitutional rights that shaped
other areas of law enforcement were effectively inapplicable” in the
immigration context.136 Another scholar’s research points out that,
“probably no other area of American law has been so radically
insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role
that animate the rest of our legal system.”137 The reasons for the
divergence of immigration law from the rest of American law in
adhering to legal norms is the subject of extensive research and
scholarship, and outside the scope of this Article.138 For purposes of
this Article, what is relevant is that the government’s immigration
power is no longer viewed as categorically exceptional as it once
was. While the power may have once been considered plenary
enough that it would override—with remarkable deference to the
federal government—the substantive rights of even American
citizens, this is changing.
The federal government’s plenary power in immigration
started to face restrictions at the turn of the twenty-first century
135. The government’s ability to exclude aliens is “essential to its safety, its
independence, and its welfare[.]” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893);
see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
136. Michael Kagan, Immigration Law’s Looming Fourth Amendment Problem, 104 GEO.
L.J. 125, 129 (2015) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment Problem].
137. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1
(1984); see also David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 583, 594–95 (2017) (“[J]udicial review of federal immigration law under
the ‘plenary power doctrine’ is extremely lax and forgiving. Thus, substantive constitutional
rights—such as equal protection, due process, freedom of association, and so on—tend to
garner less judicial scrutiny in immigration cases than other areas of federal regulation.”
(footnote omitted)).
138. “The academic literature on immigration exceptionalism is legion, featuring
commentary from nearly every prominent immigration law scholar, and others, over the past
four decades.” Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 137, at 588 n.21; see also Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909) (“Over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete . . . .”); Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note
136, at 136 (2015); Stephen H Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) (plenary power rendered immigration
law a “constitutional oddity”).
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with the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,139 in which
the Supreme Court sought to answer whether immigration law
permitted the indefinite detention of noncitizens.140 As Professor
Michael Kagan articulated:
In Zadvydas, the Court introduced two critical constitutional
tools that continue to provide fodder for constitutional challenges
to immigration law. First, in response to the government’s
argument that plenary power permitted indefinite detention, the
Court said “that power is subject to important constitutional
limitations” . . . . After a century of plenary power meaning
unlimited or nearly unreviewable power, Chadha and Zadvydas
returned immigration law to a more normal constitutional path,
wherein Congress has authority, but must still respect
fundamental rights.141

The Court resolved the question in Zadvydas by interpreting the
relevant portion of the INA regarding indefinite detentions to
require a hearing, thereby avoiding the constitutional question.142 A
decade later in Arizona v. United States, when the Court was
presented with a state law that made it a misdemeanor to violate a
federal law regarding alien-registration requirements, the Court said
that the state law was preempted, not because the federal
government’s power over immigration is inherent in national
sovereignty (the traditional rationale under immigration
exceptionalism), but because of enumerated constitutional federal
powers such as “naturalization.”143 “In short, sovereignty is not a
reason why the Constitution should not apply,” one scholar noted.144
“The exclusivity principle seems to have less traction in the Supreme

139. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Michael Kagan argues persuasively that
the shift actually started to occur in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). “What the Court did
in Chadha was to begin to normalize immigration law within the broader context of
administrative law. . . . Chadha was a critical step by which the Court gradually reintroduced
the possibility of meaningful constitutional scrutiny, setting the stage for more dramatic
changes in the twenty-first century.” Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note 136, at 141.
140. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
141. Fourth Amendment Problem, supra note 136, at 143–44.
142. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678.
143. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
144. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 137, at 616.
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Court than it once did.”145 The rationale in Arizona v. United States
revealed that the shift started by Zadvydas was gaining traction.
The same is true in Kerry v. Din.146 Although the Court rejected
the claim of a United States citizen that her due process rights were
violated when immigration authorities failed to specify the
reason(s) her foreign husband was not allowed to enter the United
States, the decision was closely decided.147 One of the reasons it was
closely decided was because, although Din was a citizen exerting
her due process claim as derived from her association with an
undocumented person, the person was not yet in the country. This
is important because “the federal government’s plenary authority
to regulate immigration . . . was usually assumed to be at its height
when a noncitizen had not yet entered the country.”148
Just recently, in Sessions v. Morales (2017), the Court dealt a
strong blow to immigration law’s exceptionalism in ruling that the
INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.149 The Court held that because the INA granted or
denied benefits based on the gender of the qualifying parent, it is
subject to heightened review under the Court’s equal protection
145. Id. at 605.
146. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); see also Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead!

Long Live Plenary Power!, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 21 (2015) [hereinafter
Plenary Power is Dead] (“Kerry v. Din[] [was] a case in which a U.S. citizen, Fauzia Din,
challenged the State Department’s refusal to grant a visa to her Afghan husband, Kanishka
Berashk, effectively refusing the couple the right to live together. Din argued that the visa
denial infringed her right to marriage, and as a matter of due process, the State Department
owed her a specific explanation for the decision. The State Department had given no
explanation except for a vague reference to the statute banning people who have engaged in
terrorist activities from entering the United States. Din did not ask the Court to rule on
whether her husband actually was a terrorist. Rather, she asked for a process that would
meaningfully allow the couple to respond to the allegations.” (footnotes omitted)).
147. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015); see also Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 22.
[In Kerry v. Din, Fauzia Din won] four justices on the Court: Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Moreover, her challenge severely divided the
other five Justices, so much so that there is no controlling decision for the case.
Only two justices—Justices Kennedy and Alito—used an analysis based on
plenary power doctrine as it has been traditionally known in immigration law. Yet,
even they were willing to assume for the sake of argument that Din was owed
some measure of due process. The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia largely
sidestepped the Court’s immigration jurisprudence and focused instead on a
critique of substantive due process jurisprudence generally.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
148. Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 22.
149. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017).
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jurisprudence. To be valid, such legislation must serve an
important government objective and the means of accomplishing it
must be substantially related to that objective. In this instance, the
INA failed that test.150
One of the most recent Supreme Court cases to touch upon the
government’s immigration power was Jennings v. Rodriguez
(2018).151 In it, the Court punted the constitutional question
whether the government’s power to enforce immigration was so
strong as to not require a bond hearing for prolonged immigration
detention.152 At the time of this writing, the Ninth Circuit will
decide the constitutionality of the government’s power to detain an
immigrant without a bond hearing. While Jennings v. Rodriguez
initially appears to shift the paradigm back to pre-Zadvydas, a
careful analysis reveals that the reasoning behind the case had
much more to do with statutory interpretation and the doctrine of
Constitutional avoidance than the fundamental issue of plenary
power. It is possible that the Court’s punt means it did not want to
advance the “important constitutional limitations” set forth in
Zadvydas. It could also be the Supreme Court choosing, as it often
does, to make legal changes slowly and incrementally. In any case,
this decision did not send backwards the new paradigm of
normalizing immigration law within U.S. law. Professor Kagan has
articulated the second view:
Just as the Court has become more willing to find
constitutional limitations on immigration enforcement, it has also
changed its conception of the foundations of that power. The
Court continues to hold that the federal government has broad
immigration authority, but it has more recently rooted this
authority in constitutionally enumerated powers, specifically
naturalization, foreign affairs, and the impact on commerce.
These two changes—finding both a source and a limit for
immigration law in the Constitution—push strongly toward
normalizing immigration within constitutional law.153

150. Id.
151. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018), remanded to 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018)

(remanding to consider the constitutional question).
152. Id.
153. Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 25.
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At a macro level, there is a change in basic assumptions about
immigration law generally. The government’s interest in enforcing
immigration laws is not as categorically exceptional as it once was.
It is now subject to “important constitutional limitations”154 and, as
Professor Kagan articulates, is grounded in enumerated powers,
not inherent in being the sovereign.155 In the Sanctuary Trials, the
court gave broad deference to the government’s immigration
interest regardless of whether it burdened a citizen’s free exercise
of religion or other constitutional rights; the Court is unlikely to
give such broad deference again.
2. The government’s interest is not focused enough to survive RFRA
scrutiny under the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision
Because the government’s interest in enforcing immigration
laws is no longer categorically exceptional and outside the norms
of American law, and because Congress did not exempt the INA
from RFRA, the court would likely subject the INA’s harboring
provision to a compelling interest standard under RFRA. What
specific goal is the government trying to accomplish with the
harboring provision? This depends on what interpretation is being
analyzed. If it is the broadest interpretation—merely “substantial
facilitation”—then the interest appears to be the government’s
desire to disincentivize undocumented people from being in the
United States. Anyone, including religiously motivated citizens, is
in violation of the statute if she makes it “easier or less difficult”156
for the undocumented person to stay in the country. If it is the
narrowest interpretation—substantial facilitation plus specific
intent to conceal from detection—then it appears that the
government’s interest is the ability to find undocumented people if
they choose to. If it is the mid-way interpretation—providing a
person “a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be
seeking him” 157—then it appears that the government’s interest is
having undocumented people easily accessible. These varying
interpretations of the harboring provision affect what the
government’s purported compelling interest is, which means they
154.
155.
156.
157.

138

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
Plenary Power is Dead, supra note 146, at 25.
United States v. Shum, 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012).
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also directly affect the viability of a claim or defense under RFRA. In
this section, I subject each one of these harboring interpretations to
the compelling interest test of RFRA scrutiny. I analyze them at a
micro level, since the compelling interest that the government may
attempt to advance under its formerly plenary power doctrine has
already been shown as weak.
Under the broadest interpretation—harboring as merely
“substantial facilitation”—the government’s argument is that it has
a compelling interest in enforcing immigration laws uniformly and
needs to be able to punish anyone, without exception, who merely
substantially helps an undocumented immigrant stay in the
country. This interpretation reveals the weakest governmental
interest. The government must show that in spite of the twelve
million undocumented people that have not faced prosecution
—some of them for many years and with fluctuating stages of
status—it has a compelling interest in criminally prosecuting
citizens for making it easier for an undocumented person to remain
in the United States, regardless of whether the citizen is exercising
a fundamental right such as being religiously motivated to aid the
undocumented immigrant.
In the old religious freedom paradigm which existed during the
Sanctuary Trials, the court was concerned about the consequences
of granting a Free Exercise defense that could create a “personal
immigration polic[y].”158 They reasoned that, if they allowed an
exception to the harboring provision for religiously motivated
conduct, even if interpreted as merely “substantial facilitation,” it
“would result in no immigration policy at all.”159 This common
bureaucratic concern for uniform enforcement, however, has been
decisively dismantled in the new religious freedom law paradigm.
RFRA requires a “more focused inquiry.”160 In Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal the Supreme Court
demonstrated this new shift when it applied RFRA to the
Controlled Substances Act, 161 which the government argued could

158. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 696 (9th Cir. 1989).
159. Id.
160. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,

420 (2006).
161. Id. at 439.
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not accommodate exceptions, even towards a religious group’s
sacramental use of hoasca.162 The Court found that RFRA requires
a determination of whether exceptions, including to criminal laws,
are possible.163
The government’s argument in O Centro, that it maintained a
general interest in uniform enforcement of the Controlled
Substance Act as a “‘closed’ system that prohibits all use of
controlled substances . . . [and] ‘cannot function with its necessary
rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial exemptions,’”
was flatly rejected.164 The Court has previously stated that “only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”165
Although the compelling interest standard must be applied to the
particularized facts of a case,166 the broad interpretation of the
harboring provision will likely not pass RFRA’s compelling interest
scrutiny (which the Supreme Court called “onerous”167) in the large
swath of cases where religiously motivated people are merely
“substantially facilitating” undocumented immigrants.
Under the narrowest interpretation—harboring as substantial
facilitation plus specific intent to conceal from detection—the
government’s argument is likely that it has a compelling interest in
being able to detect undocumented people. As a result, it also has a
compelling interest in being able to punish anyone who conceals the
undocumented persons such that the government cannot detect
them. This is the government’s interest almost at its strongest.168
The government is acknowledging it does not have the capacity to
162. Hoasca is “a hallucinogenic tea . . . made from two plants found only in the
Amazon rain forest,” including a controversial substance called DMT. Linda Greenhouse,
Sect Allowed to Import Its Hallucinogenic Tea, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2006), https://www
.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/politics/sect-allowed-to-import-its-hallucinogenic-tea.html.
163. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 439.
164. Id. at 430.
165. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
166. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 726 (2014) (“[RFRA] requires
the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particularized claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31)).
167. See id. at 729 n.37.
168. The government’s interest could be stronger if the provision were even more
narrowly interpreted so as to prevent the concealing of undocumented people known to be,
or in reckless disregard of the fact, criminals. See Jain, supra note 43.
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deport the millions of undocumented people living in the country,
but it is focusing on its more specific interest in being able to detect
undocumented people, should it need or want to deport them. This
may pass RFRA’s compelling interest test because it is not “whole
system” enforcement; rather, it is more specifically focused.169
The mid-way interpretation—providing a “person a place
where the authorities are unlikely to be seeking him”—is likely to
fall in between the broadest and narrowest interpretations on the
compelling interest spectrum. It appears the government’s interest
is that it should have easy access to undocumented persons. This
interpretation is the most challenging to analyze under the
Supreme Court’s RFRA jurisprudence of the compelling interest
standard because it is unclear whether the Court would find this
interest overly broad. It is also difficult because little guidance is
given to what is meant by a place where “it is unlikely that the
authorities will be seeking him”170 and who determines this. The
fact that authorities are unlikely to be seeking an undocumented
person in a sanctuary (because they are “sensitive” locations171)
could further complicate this interpretation for religiously
motivated people.
In summary, while the government’s immigration power may
be strong and comprehensive, it is no longer outside the boundaries
of constitutional norms. Unlike in the Sanctuary Trials, the federal
government must show that its interest is compelling, not as a
system, but in a more focused way. If the government is
prosecuting a religiously motivated person under the broadest
interpretation of the harboring provision (merely “substantial
facilitation”), it is likely going to fail showing it has a compelling
interest under RFRA. It is no longer sufficient for the government
to argue it has a compelling interest in the uniform enforcement of
a criminal law, even if it is an immigration law.172 If the government

169.
170.
171.
172.

O Centro, 546 U.S. at 419.
United States v. McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 2015).
FAQ on Sensitive Locations and Courthouse Arrests, supra note 34.
The one exception to this seems to be the taxation system. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S.
at 733–34 (2014).
HHS also raises for the first time in this Court the argument that applying the
contraceptive mandate to for-profit employers with sincere religious objections is
essential to the comprehensive health-insurance scheme that ACA establishes.
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is prosecuting a religiously motivated person under the narrowest
interpretation, or possibly under the middle view of the harboring
provision (substantial facilitation plus intent to conceal from
detection or providing a place where the authorities are unlikely to
be seeking him, respectively), it may prevail in showing that it has
a compelling interest because its interest is more focused on being
able to find undocumented people rather than a broadly
formulated interest in uniform enforcement of immigration laws.
C. Under the Broadest Interpretation, the Government’s Exceptions for
Analogous Secular Conduct Will Prevent a Showing That it
Used the Least Restrictive Means as Required by RFRA
RFRA’s last requirement is that, assuming the government can
show it has a compelling interest, it must also show there are no
other means of achieving this interest without imposing a
substantial burden on religion.173 This last standard of RFRA is
“exceptionally demanding.”174 The broadest interpretation of the
provision will likely not pass the compelling interest test of RFRA.
But, even if the court were willing to assume, for the sake of

HHS analogizes the contraceptive mandate to the requirement to pay Social
Security taxes, which we upheld in Lee despite the religious objection of an
employer, but these cases are quite different. Our holding in Lee turned primarily
on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation. . . . We
observed that “[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed
to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that
violates their religious belief.”
Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, [sic] case, but if the issue in Lee were
analyzed under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there
simply is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes.
Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures funded by tax
dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax obligations on
religious grounds would lead to chaos.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).
It is worth further distinguishing Lee by noting that the Court said that the social
security system rests on “a complex of actuarial factors,” Lee, 455 U.S. at 259, and that
exceptions could not be made because the very purpose of the system depended on everyone
participating: “Moreover, a comprehensive national social security system providing for
voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult, if not
impossible, to administer.” Id. at 258.
173. Under this test, the government would have to show that it “lacks other means of
achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.”
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 728.
174. Id.
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argument, that the government did meet its burden in showing a
compelling interest, the broadest interpretation will still likely not
survive RFRA’s least restrictive means test. This is especially true
because the government will be hard pressed to show why
religiously motivated people cannot also provide non-clandestine
humanitarian aid when secular institutions are being permitted to
do so.
Moreover, assuming the government had the desire and
capacity to deport every undocumented person, it could still
accomplish that goal if undocumented people are being provided
with aid or shelter openly. Even if the government could show that
allowing citizens to provide non-clandestine aid to undocumented
people made it more expensive for the government to apprehend
these undocumented immigrants, the court would likely find this a
worthy cost. “[RFRA] may in some circumstances require the
Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’
religious beliefs.”175 Congress understood that protecting religious
exercise may increase the government’s costs and was willing to
accept that cost; “[t]his chapter may require a government to incur
expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial
burden on religious exercise.”176
Not only is the government likely to fail the least restrictive
means test of RFRA because it has “other means” of finding
undocumented immigrants while still allowing them to receive
humanitarian aid, but the government itself has already allowed
an analogous system of substantial facilitation through
humanitarian aid to undocumented immigrants available for
secular institutions such as public schools and hospitals.177 The
government's argument that it cannot more narrowly tailor its
means therefore is fatally flawed.
In Hobby Lobby, when discussing the system of exceptions to the
contraceptive mandate provided for in the Affordable Care Act, the
Court noted: “Although HHS has made this system available to
religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the
contraceptive mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same
175. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c) (2012).
177. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
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system cannot be made available [to corporations].”178 Likewise, a
person with a RFRA claim or defense could argue that the
government already has a system of exceptions available that
allows, and even mandates, substantial facilitation to
undocumented people. Undocumented immigrants are permitted
to send their (also potentially undocumented) children to public
school.179 Moreover, public schools are not allowed to inquire or
report the status of undocumented immigrants.180 Hospitals are
required to provide emergency care to undocumented people.181
Undocumented immigrants have many of the same labor rights as
authorized workers under federal law, including the ability to
receive workers compensation, join a union, receive state disability
benefits, and report health and safety violations.182 Although state
law is beyond the scope of this Article, some states provide more
extensive opportunities for undocumented people.183

178. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 692.
179. Doe, 457 U.S. at 205.
180. Immigrant Students’ Rights to Attend Public Schools - School Opening Alert 2017, IDRA

NEWSL. (Intercultural Development Research Association, San Antonio, Tex.), August 2017,
https://www.idra.org/resource-center/immigrant-students-rights-attend-public-schools
-school-opening-alert-2017/.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
182. See Undocumented Workers’ Employment Rights, LEGAL AID AT WORK, https://
legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/undocumented-workers-employment-rights/ (last visited
Apr. 9, 2019).
183. Id. Some states offer medical insurance to undocumented people.
Ruben Castaneda, Where Can Undocumented Immigrants Go for Health Care?, U.S. NEWS (Nov.
2, 2016, 1:01 PM), https://health.usnews.com/wellness/articles/2016-11-02/where-can
-undocumented-immigrants-go-for-health-care. Medical schools often provide free medical
care to known undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are helped by state
and federal housing laws that prohibit discrimination against them. See also Angela Hart,
Rent Increases, Evictions Up in Immigrant Communities Under Trump, Housing Lawyers Say,
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 10, 2017 12:01 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics
-government/capitol-alert/article160239609.html. California’s recently adopted budget
includes $45 million to assist undocumented people and has recently proposed a law to give
undocumented people the right to sue their landlord for threatening to report them or
actually reporting them to ICE. Amy Dobson, Calif. Lawmakers Approve Bill
Protecting Undocumented Immigrant Tenants from Landlord Harassment, WASH. POST (Sep. 19,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/where-we-live/wp/2017/09/19/califlawmakers-approve-bill-protecting-undocumented-immigrant-tenants-from-landlord
-harassment; Jazmine Ulloa, Nearly $50 Million in the California State Budget Will Go to
Expanded Legal Services for Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2017, 6:38 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-nearly-50
-million-in-the-california-1497576640-htmlstory.html. As of May 2017, some states allow
undocumented immigrants to receive state driver licenses. Gilberto Mendoza, States
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Considering an extensive system of exceptions to the broadest
interpretation of the harboring provision (merely “substantial
facilitation”), the government will be hard pressed to provide a
reason why accommodation for religiously motivated people and
organizations cannot be made available. The government would
likely lose under the least restrictive means test of RFRA. As Justice
Kennedy said, “[T]he government has not made the second
showing required by RFRA, that the means it uses to regulate is the
least restrictive way to further its interest. . . . [T]he record in these
cases shows that there is an existing, recognized, workable, and
already-implemented framework to provide coverage.”184
When there is an “existing, recognized, workable and alreadyimplemented framework” for providing “substantial facilitation”
to undocumented immigrants through public schools, hospitals, or
in a host of other secular ways, the government’s denial of
religiously motivated aid to undocumented immigrants is not
likely to going to pass the least restrictive means test of RFRA.185 A
court examining the least restrictive means test in this context
would likely say, “[W]e therefore conclude that this system
constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government’s
aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty.”186
Whether a religiously motivated claimant or defendant could
succeed on a Free Exercise defense under the First Amendment is
beyond the scope of this Article, but there does seem to be a strong
possibility for success under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Employment Division v. Smith.187 There, the Court articulated a
“mechanism for individualized exceptions”188 which might be
better described as an exceptions exception. The Smith Court sent
shock waves through the community of Free Exercise scholars for
its controversial decision, in which laws that are “valid and neutral

Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (updated Nov.
30, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-s-licenses-to
-immigrants.aspx.
184. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 737–38 (2014).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 692.
187. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
188. Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 106 S. 2147, 2156 (1986)).
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law[s] of general applicability” 189 are usually not granted religious
accommodations. The Court said, however, that if the government
is already making exceptions to a rule for secular conduct, it cannot
escape strict scrutiny for denying an exception to the same rule for
religiously motivated conduct.190 As Justice Scalia explained while
writing for the majority, “[W]here the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to
cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”191 Given
the number of exemptions already available to individuals for
purely secular conduct such as public education, medical care, and
labor laws to the broadest interpretation of the harboring provision,
the government will likely face a strong Free Exercise defense, even
under Smith.
Under the narrowest interpretation of the harboring provision,
the government has a stronger chance of showing it had no less
restrictive means of achieving its interest, because under this
interpretation, the government’s interest is in being able to find the
undocumented person. Under this narrow interpretation, the
religiously motivated claimant or defendant will be hard pressed
to show that the government was systematically allowing for
exceptions to concealing undocumented people from detection
(and not merely providing substantial help in a non-clandestine
manner as hospitals, labor laws, or schools do). Moreover, whether
the churches or religiously motivated people could be successful in
mounting a defense under RFRA for concealing undocumented
people is beyond the scope of this Article since “concealing”
undocumented people is clearly prohibited by the INA’s § 1324.
This Article offers the modest point that to help clear up the
ambiguity in the harboring provision of § 1324, the viability of a
RFRA claim or defense for a large number of people should be
influential in an overall interpretive rationale.

189. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455, 102 S. Ct. 1051, 1058, n.3 (1982)).
190. Id. at 884.
191. Id.
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V. USING RFRA PROPHYLACTICALLY TO INTERPRET THE
AMBIGUOUS PROVISION IS THE BEST WAY TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE
A solution to this potential large-scale conflict between a broad
interpretation of the INA’s harboring provision and RFRA is found
in the text and spirit of RFRA itself. Since a large amount of religious
people would be affected by the ambiguity that remains in the INA’s
harboring provision despite the federal courts’ employment of
traditional rules of interpretation, the ambiguity should be resolved
by using RFRA to influence a narrow construction of the provision
and thereby avert a wide-spread RFRA problem. Traditionally,
RFRA is used on the back-end of a federal law to craft a judicial caseby-case exception to an otherwise neutral and generally applicable
law where that law substantially burdens a person’s exercise of
religion (and where the government does not override that
substantial burden with a compelling interest that is narrowly
tailored).192 While RFRA has not generally been viewed as a tool to
construe an ambiguous prior statute, there are some rare instances,
such as the INA’s harboring provision, where such an application
makes sense in order to fulfill RFRA’s mandate.
This proposal may sound like the privileged doctrine of
constitutional avoidance being applied with RFRA: if RFRA casts
doubts on a statute’s ability to survive RFRA scrutiny, the RFRA
question is avoided altogether by construing the statute narrowly.
That is not an accurate understanding. Scholars have written
persuasively about what kind of statute RFRA is—some calling it
a “super-statute,”193 a precommitment statute,194 or even an
unconstitutional statute.195 But the one thing everyone can agree on
is that RFRA is not the Constitution and it does not carry the same

192. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 421
(2006). (“The Government’s argument that the existence of a congressional exemption for
peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to judicially crafted
exceptions fails because RFRA plainly contemplates court-recognized exceptions . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
193. Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S.
Code, 56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 253 (1995).
194. Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal
Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1920 (2001).
195. Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period,
1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 19 (1998).
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weight as the Constitution. RFRA is, after all, subject to the same
rules of modification or repeal as other statutes.196 So I am not
proposing that statutory interpreters create a doctrine of RFRA
avoidance that should trump all other interpretive considerations
solely to avoid a problem with RFRA.
I am also not proposing that we harmonize the statutes.
Whatever RFRA is—super-statute, pre-commitment statute,
framework statute, foundational statute—just about everyone agrees
it is not just like every other statute. Scholars who support and
oppose RFRA have argued that RFRA “amends” all federal law.197
RFRA by its own terms says that it applies “to all Federal law, and
the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after [this enactment of this Act].”198 It
states that all federal law is “subject” to it.199 RFRA is not on equal
footing with other statutes. RFRA is on a higher level.
Using RFRA to narrowly construe a prior ambiguous statute
after traditional tools of interpretation have failed is more like using
it as a later tool of interpretation, and less like an avoidance doctrine
or a harmonization rule. I am not offering a comprehensive theory
on how RFRA could be used as a tool of statutory construction. I
am offering the much more modest point that, when a statute like
the INA’s § 1324 harboring provision is irreducibly ambiguous, and
one construction would lead to a viable RFRA claim or defense for
a sweeping amount of religious people, and another construction
likely does not, it is reasonable to use RFRA as a tool of construction
(in certain circumstances). In the first instance, this use should
happen with executive officials when they exercise their
discretionary interpretive judgment. If executive officials fail to do
this, as they did in United States v. Warren,200 then courts should use
RFRA to narrowly construe § 1324’s harboring provision.

196. Even admirers of RFRA admit this. See Magarian, supra note 194, at 1928 & n.110.
(“Federal RFRA is only a statute, and it occupies the same, inferior position to the
Constitution that every other federal statute occupies.”).
197. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 270; see also Hamilton, supra note 195, at 7–8.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
199. Id. § 2000bb-3(b).
200. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
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While one may agree with my proposal as applied to executive
officials, one major objection to my proposal is that if judges use
RFRA as a tool of construction for INA § 1324, the statute’s scope is
narrowed beyond what RFRA requires, i.e., secular conduct is
protected as well as religious conduct. Undoubtedly, Congress
intended for RFRA to protect religiously motivated conduct “in all
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”201
This makes my method an imperfect solution because it is
overinclusive in theory. But the alternative—using the traditional
case-by-case exception method—is not the best solution in this
situation because it will merely attempt to treat a rampant and an
overwhelming amount of RFRA claims and defenses. If widespread
injury to religious freedom can be prophylactically prevented by
utilizing RFRA as a tool that narrowly construes § 1324 when the
traditional tools have failed to interpret it, then this is the best use
of RFRA, even if it is overinclusive in protecting secular conduct, as
well. I discuss in further detail later why I think the over
inclusiveness of my proposal is more of an asset than a liability.202
Specifically, my argument for a RFRA-based statutory
construction of INA § 1324 is as follows: (A) It follows a fortiori that
since RFRA amends all federal law, RFRA should influence the
interpretation of an irreducibly ambiguous, previously enacted
statute. (B) This is consistent with RFRA’s statutory framework and
the Constitution. (C) Using RFRA as a tool of construction for
previously enacted statutes, like the harboring provision, is not a
technique that should be invoked all of the time, but there are good
reasons for invoking it here.
The first of these reasons is that, because a large percentage of
the conduct prosecuted under a broad interpretation of the
harboring provision would be religiously motivated, the efficient
administration of justice would be better served by considering
RFRA to construe the statute narrowly. This method is easier for
the courts to administer than case-by-case accommodations
because it prevents an onslaught of cases from burdening the court
system, which would likely require the courts to delve into the
nature and sincerity of a claimant or defendant’s beliefs. The second

201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
202. See supra Section IV.B.
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reason is that this method prevents the burden of litigation to
religiously motivated defendants. Third, another substantive canon
of construction—the rule of lenity—counsels in favor of a narrow
construction and courts are familiar with implementing it. While it
is not within the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that my
proposal also avoids the contention that arises from the more
conventional case-by-case exemption approach where the tension
is not necessary. While it is best if executive officials adopt this
method of allowing RFRA to influence their statutory construction
of an ambiguous statute, if they do not, then courts should (as
shown by United States v. Warren203).
A. It Follows A Fortiori that Since RFRA Amends All Federal Law,
RFRA Should Influence the Construction of an
Ambiguous, Previously Enacted Statute
The applicability section of RFRA states in § 3(a): “IN
GENERAL.— This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and
whether adopted before or after November 16, 1993.”204
It is generally agreed that Congress intended RFRA to serve as
an amendment to all federal law.205 “RFRA operates as a sweeping
‘super-statute,’ cutting across all other federal statutes (now and
future, unless specifically exempted) and modifying their reach.”206
It follows a fortiori that if RFRA amends all federal law, including
previously enacted statutes, that RFRA should at least influence the
construction of an ambiguous prior statute after other traditional
interpretive tools have failed.
One objection to this logic is that of a general retrospective
method of interpretation; it is the concern “for far reaching and
unanticipated consequences”207—the same concern that was held

203. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2012).
205. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 270; see also Hamilton, supra note 195, at 7–8.
206. See Paulsen, supra note 193, at 253.
207. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 2085, 2113 (2002) (quoting Federalism Accountability Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 1214
Before the Senate S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 303 (1999) (statement of
Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Counsel)).
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by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which
considered the appropriate scope of the proposed Federalism
Accountability Act, which would have had general retrospective
(as well as prospective) application.208 The Senate Committee was
concerned that, as applied to prior acts, “it would have unsettled
vast areas of preemption doctrine, shrinking the already-judiciallydetermined preemptive effect of countless federal statutes.”209
Professor Rosenkranz explained:
The objection to retrospective interpretive statutes is that they
amend the entire United States Code in one fell swoop. Congress
of course has constitutional power to do so; indeed, Congress
could repeal the entire United States Code with one sentence if it
so chose. But mandating a new interpretive principle to gloss all
previous acts of Congress may seem a particularly irresponsible
way to amend the United States Code. Perhaps it is implausible
that Congress could analyze thoroughly the sudden effects of
such a statute. The potential for “far reaching and unanticipated
consequences” is the heart of the objection to general retrospective
interpretive statues.210

Whether RFRA was a good idea as a matter of policy, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article. Like it or not, RFRA is a
retrospective interpretive statute. While this has traditionally been
understood as commanding case-by-case exemptions to prior
federal law that meets RFRA’s strict scrutiny test, my point is that
it is not clear if that is the only way RFRA amends federal law. If a
prior federal statute is notoriously ambiguous after the traditional
interpretive tools have been used (as evidenced by the federal
circuit split over the scope of § 1324), RFRA—as an “amendment”
to § 1324—should influence the final construction of it.
Another objection is that, since the INA predates RFRA, we do
not know whether Congress would have exempted it from RFRA
(whereas Congress can create a clear statement exception to RFRA
in future statutes, which creates the implication that if Congress
does not create such an exception, they did not want one).211 But

208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2113–14.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (2012) (requiring a clear statement to exempt future
statutes from RFRA).
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this objection proves too much. Since the INA was created before
RFRA was enacted, if Congress meant to exempt it, or any part of
it, from RFRA’s reach, it could have done so in RFRA itself.
B. Using RFRA to Narrowly Construe § 1324 Is Consistent with
RFRA’s Statutory Framework and the Constitution
RFRA has not generally been viewed as a tool of construction.
Instead, it has generally been viewed as requiring judicially crafted
exceptions to general rules of applicability. RFRA’s text does not
say that it is solely to be mobilized as judicially crafted exceptions.
The Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purposes and the
Applicability sections are particularly helpful in considering how
to implement RFRA.212 They state:
§ 2000bb. Congressional findings and declaration of purposes
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that—
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its
protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden
religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward
religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior
Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking
sensible balances between religious liberty and
competing prior governmental interests.

212. See Id. § 2000bb.
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(b) Purposes
The purposes of this chapter are—
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by
government. 213
§ 2000bb-3. Applicability
(a) In general
This chapter applies to all Federal law, and the
implementation of that law, whether statutory or
otherwise, and whether adopted before or after
November 16, 1993.
(b) Rule of construction
Federal statutory law adopted after November 16, 1993,
is subject to this chapter unless such law explicitly
excludes such application by reference to this chapter.
(c) Religious belief unaffected
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize
any government to burden any religious belief.214

RFRA provides judicial relief for a person whose religious
exercise has been substantially burdened by the government,
stating they may exert either a claim or a defense under RFRA in
court.215 Undoubtedly, RFRA provides an explicit private right of
action. Whether a successful class action can be brought under
RFRA is beyond the scope of this Article, but is being reasonably
attempted.216 The fact that RFRA provides a private right of action,
however, does not preclude implementing RFRA’s broader

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. § 2000bb-3.
Id. § 2000bb(b)(2); Id. § 2000bb-1(c).
See Teneng v. Trump, No. 5:18-cv-01609-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal. filed Aug. 1, 2018).
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mandate and purpose to “restore the compelling interest test . . .
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened”217 in limited instances of
statutory construction, especially where doing so would be both a
prophylactic measure to prevent unnecessary widespread burdens
on religious exercise and a prophylactic measure to prevent
needless contention with non-religiously motivated conduct.
Moreover, RFRA’s Applicability Section states that it applies to
the implementation of all federal law, regardless of whether such
law was adopted before or after the enactment of RFRA.218
Executive officials have the authority to weigh RFRA’s mandate in
implementing the law through their exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Whether rule-making agencies such as the Department
of Homeland Security should allow RFRA to prophylactically
influence their discretion is beyond the scope of this Article as this
Article is limited to instances, like INA § 1324, where a pre-RFRA
statute is irreducibly ambiguous, and courts must construe it to
effectively “implement” the law.
The second part of RFRA’s Applicability Section is the Rule of
Construction: “federal statutory law adopted after [the date of this
enactment of this Act] is subject to this Act unless such law
explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.”219
Almost certainly this provision was created to dispel any doubt
about where RFRA ranked on the hierarchy of subsequently
enacted laws. It says that RFRA has the higher ground; subsequent
laws are not to be harmonized with RFRA in traditional ways
unless the subsequent law has a clear statement exception to RFRA.
This prospective rule of construction has led to scholarly debate,
most notably between Lawrence Tribe, Nicholas Rosenkranz, Larry
Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash, and others, about the propriety and
constitutionality of Congress imposing mandatory prospective
rules of statutory interpretation.220 Imposing “constraints upon, or

217.
218.
219.
220.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012).
Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
Id. § 2000bb-3(b).
See Rosenkranz, supra note 207, at 2113-14. But see Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003).

154

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

107

8/13/19 3:35 AM

Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA

tak[ing] presumptive priority over, downstream legislative
decision making” is subject to special concerns that are not
applicable to using RFRA as a retrospective rule of construction for
statutes like the INA and is beyond the scope of this Article.221
What matters for purposes of resolving the ambiguity in the
INA’s harboring provision is whether it is constitutional for RFRA
to be used as a retrospective method of statutory interpretation
(assuming that it is within the statutory framework of RFRA itself
as discussed previously). As Professor Rosenkranz notes, there is
nothing in the Constitution that prevents Congress from creating a
retrospective method of statutory interpretation, in general.222
Examining whether this specific retrospective method is
constitutional is best accomplished by, as Rosenkranz instructs,
asking what former method is being displaced by the proposed
method and whether that former method is constitutionally
required.223 In this case, using RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard as a
method of interpretation displaces the standard set out in
Employment Division v. Smith, that laws which are neutral and
generally applicable are not required to meet strict scrutiny under
the Free Exercise Clause.224 Congress intended RFRA to be a
“powerful tool . . . shift[ing] an animating policy of federal law
without picking through the United States Code section by
section.”225 This shift in policy was to ratchet up the standard of
what is required by the Free Exercise Clause. When the strict
scrutiny standard is applied on a retail level, the court balances
various competing interests, including constitutional ones. When
RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate is applied wholesale—as a method
of statutory construction to resolve ambiguity in a statute—this
ratcheted-up free exercise standard must not upset the usual
balance with the Establishment Clause.226
An analysis of whether using RFRA as a retrospective method
of statutory construction is constitutional is a substantive question
221. Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125
YALE L.J. 400, 421 (2015).
222. Rosenkranz, supra note 207.
223. See id. at 2087.
224. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
225. See Rosenkranz, supra note 207, at 2114.
226. See generally id.
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that should be resolved by weighing Establishment Clause
concerns on a statute specific basis. Courts should weigh
Establishment Clause considerations because using RFRA’s
mandate as an interpretive method wholesale may
“unconstitutionally privilege[] religious interests at the expense of
secular interests”227 in a way that does not usually happen when
RFRA is used to craft a limited exception. In this instance, however,
using RFRA to resolve the ambiguity in the INA’s harboring
provision would not upset the usual Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause balance because it leads to a narrower
construction of the criminal provision for not only religiously
motivated conduct but purely secular conduct as well. This is, even
many RFRA skeptics would likely agree, a constitutional use of
RFRA. As one scholar puts it, the RFRA protection in this instance
would not “improperly privilege religion, because [it] would [not]
inequitably relieve believers of constraints from which many
nonbelievers might also prefer to be free.”228
C. There Are Good Reasons for Using RFRA as a Tool of Construction
for Specific Prior Ambiguous Statutes, like the Harboring Provision
Allowing RFRA to influence the construction of prior statutes
when traditional tools have failed is a technique that should not be
invoked all the time. As the Article discusses more fully in Part V,
it should be invoked in certain narrow circumstances. There are,
however, good reasons for invoking it here. First, it is easier for the
courts to administer than case-by-case accommodations because it
prevents an onslaught of cases from burdening the administration
of the courts—something that would likely lead to inappropriate
judicial scrutiny of religious beliefs. Second, it prevents the burden
of litigation to religiously motivated defendants. Third, the rule of
lenity advises it. Lastly, it avoids the needless contention that some
scholars argue arises from the more conventional case-by-case
approach, which sometimes privileges religious conduct over
secular conduct.

227. Magarian, supra note 194, at 1970.
228. Id. at 1977.
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1. A RFRA-based construction of the harboring provision prevents both
the onslaught of cases from burdening the courts and the needless
judicial scrutiny of religious beliefs
Mobilizing RFRA’s mandate prophylactically to construe
narrowly the ambiguous harboring provision is easier for the
court to administer than case-by-case accommodations because a
narrow construction prevents an onslaught of accommodation
cases from burdening the court system. If the Trump
administration creates another “zero tolerance” policy229 and
strictly and narrowly enforces § 1324 as it is doing in United States
v. Warren,230 there will be widespread RFRA defenses and
probably widespread RFRA claims. There might even be a RFRA
class-action. This sweeping mobilization of RFRA in response to a
narrow construction of a federal criminal law will cause the court
to delve into the nature and sincerity of a claimant or defendant’s
beliefs to discern which qualify.231
Few other instances in the U.S. Code make what is generally
understood as charitable conduct (i.e. “substantially facilitating” an
undocumented person’s stay regardless of intent to hide them from
authorities) a criminal offense. Not only is this unusual in and of
itself, but the large presence of unauthorized aliens in the United
States makes it extraordinarily difficult for charitable people to
avoid violating a broad interpretation of § 1324, even if they are not
providing open sanctuary. A broad spectrum of conduct falls under
the standard of “substantial facilitation” of an undocumented
person. Defendants who have been charged with “harboring”
under this broad interpretation of the statute may raise a RFRA
defense, whether they are motivated by a mainstream religious
belief, an obscure religious belief, something that looks like
religious belief, some other deeply held conscientious objection, or
229. Trump’s “zero tolerance” policy has already strained the federal court system,
leading to mass trials. See Russell Berman, 85 Immigrants Sentenced Together Before One Judge,
THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06
/zero-tolerance-inside-a-south-texas-courtroom/563135/.
230. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
231. For a full discussion on the complexity surrounding the court’s examination of
the nature and sincerity of religious belief in religious freedom cases, see Nathan S.
Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185 (2017).
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a philosophical belief based on generally accepted understandings
of the Golden Rule.232 Given that RFRA was amended to even more
broadly cover religious exercise than it initially did233 and given the
wide-ranging amount of people charitably helping undocumented
immigrants, it is not hard to foresee widespread RFRA defenses, or
a RFRA class-action being raised to a narrow (“merely substantial
facilitation”) interpretation of § 1324, should executive officials
strictly enforce § 1324’s prohibition against those who harbor, as
prosecutors are doing right now in United States v. Warren.234
2. Using a RFRA-based construction of the harboring provision prevents
the burden of litigation to religiously motivated defendants
Similarly, mobilizing RFRA to construe an ambiguous statute
with strong RFRA implications like the harboring provision
prevents unnecessary criminal prosecution from burdening
religiously motivated people. It hardly needs stating that
undergoing prosecution for a federal crime is burdensome. Not
only is there the potential loss of liberty and extensive legal costs,
but the stigma associated with being criminally prosecuted can last
a lifetime. Congress and the courts have recognized the burden that
even the threat of litigation can place on Free Exercise. The text of
RFRA also acknowledges this and provides that RFRA can be not
only a defense, but a “claim . . . to persons whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened by government.”235 In providing for a
RFRA claim, Congress gave religiously motivated people not just a
shield from prosecution, but also a sword to stop a potential threat
of prosecution from having a chilling effect on their religious
exercise. If the harboring provision is interpreted broadly, with the
expectation that RFRA accommodations will be made on the back
-end of the statute on a case-by-case basis during litigation, the
potential chilling effect could be wide-ranging on religious
exercise, given the number and diversity of religiously motivated
people who are, or want to be, aiding undocumented people.

232. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 2 and 3 at 2, Warren, 2018
WL 5257807.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2012).
234. United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (emphasis added).
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Preventing religious people from being burdened with the
widespread threat of prosecution is consistent with the text of
RFRA, which provides broad and robust coverage for religious
exercise. It is arguably more consistent with the spirit of RFRA to
avert this chilling of religious exercise where the litigation burden
is unnecessary and can be avoided prophylactically.
3. The rule of lenity advises answering the interpretive question in
§ 1324 consistently with a RFRA-based construction and judges are
familiar with implementing it
“One of the most fundamental principles of the criminal law is
that it should punish culpable conduct—bad acts by persons with
culpable mental states. One significant reason for this principle is
obvious: The criminal law exists to maintain order through
predictable schemes of punishment . . . .”236 The rule of lenity is a
substantive canon of interpretation that, as a matter of policy,
addresses this concern regarding criminal culpability. As one
scholar succinctly put it, the rule of lenity “requires that ambiguity
in criminal statutes be resolved in favor of the defendant.”237
While a fulsome analysis of applying the rule of lenity’s
interpretive framework is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to realize this “ancient principle [that] direct[s] judges to
construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly,”238 and advises
answering the interpretive question posed in § 1324’s harboring
provision in a way consistent with RFRA and in a way which
judges are already familiar with implementing. Like the RFRAbased construction this Article proposes, the rule of lenity is not the
highest priority rule in statutory interpretation. “Judges who
consider the framework may ultimately reject the rule in favor of a
higher-priority canon, a claim of statutory clarity reached through
reading the text and applying other interpretive tools, or a
competing constitutional concern.”239 When, exactly, in the
interpretive process RFRA should influence judges is beyond the

236. Mary L. Dohrmann, Hemming in “Harboring”: The Limits of Liability Under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 and State Harboring Statutes, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 1237 (2015).
237. Id. at 1239.
238. Intisar A. Rabb, Response, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179,
180 (2018).
239. Id. at 182.
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scope of this Article. This Article’s modest point is that while RFRA
should not be the highest priority tool in interpretation, it can and
should be a part of the interpretive rationale when the higher
priority tools are not working to provide clarity.
VI. HOW A RFRA-BASED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE
HARBORING PROVISION IS REACHED
A. The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Using the RFRA-Based
Statutory Construction of the Harboring Provision
This Article explained in Part IV why RFRA should be used to
construct the ambiguous harboring provision, as opposed to creating
case-by-case exemptions. This section seeks to explain when and
how a RFRA-based statutory construction of a federal provision such
as the harboring provision should be invoked. My proposal is as
follows: (1) if the federal statute remains ambiguous after employing
standard rules of interpretation and (2) after scrutinizing each
interpretation of the ambiguous statute under RFRA’s strict scrutiny
test, one interpretation of the ambiguous statute creates a viable
RFRA claim or defense, and (3) there are prudential reasons for
mobilizing RFRA on a macro scale instead of case-by-case
exemptions, such as because a large amount of religiously motivated
people would be implicated and (4) the usual balance with the
Establishment Clause is not upset by mobilizing RFRA this way,
then (5) invoke a RFRA-based statutory construction of the statute so
as to avert a large scale RFRA problem.
As already discussed in Part II, the INA’s § 1324 remains
irreducibly ambiguous even after applying traditional rules of
interpretation. As Part III discussed, the broadest interpretation of
the harboring provision (“substantial facilitation”) creates a viable
RFRA claim or defense. As Part IV discussed, this broad
interpretation will implicate the conduct of a large amount of
religiously motivated people, which will burden the courts. Because
of this, it is better to employ RFRA as a tool of statutory construction
than to use it on a case-by-case exemption basis. When the RFRA
-based statutory construction of the harboring provision is complete,
a narrow interpretation of the harboring provision (“substantial
facilitation” plus concealment) results (which would apply to both
religiously and non-religiously motivated people alike).
160

003.INKS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

107

8/13/19 3:35 AM

Looming RFRA Problem Can Be Solved by RFRA

B. RFRA Should Influence the Statutory Interpretation of the Harboring
Provision First at the Prosecutorial Stage and the Courts, if Necessary
Until this point in the Article, the discussion has centered on
RFRA influencing the court’s construction of an ambiguous statute.
The interpretation, however, should first be influenced at the
prosecutorial discretion stage for two primary reasons. First, as a
general matter, prosecutors have long exercised discretion in
initiating a charge under federal law (resulting in a “case or
controversy” starting) and that discretion generally considers
viable defenses that would undermine the ability for a prosecutor
to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the Justice
Manual specifically details that religious liberty concerns should
inform litigation strategy.
1. Prosecutors have discretion in initiating a charge under federal law
and consider viable defenses that would undermine the case
The Justice Manual describes the general discretion prosecutors
exercise when initiating a charge:
Under the federal criminal justice system, the prosecutor has
wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even
whether to prosecute for apparent violations of federal criminal
law. The prosecutor’s broad discretion in such areas as initiating
or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific
charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas
has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See,
e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Oyler v. Boles,
368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d
733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
This discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor’s status as a
member of the Executive Branch, and the President’s
responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that the laws of
the United States be “faithfully executed.” U.S. Const. Art. II § 3.
See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974).240

240. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-27.110 (2018),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/justice-manual.
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This broad discretion includes whether to initiate a charge
where a viable defense (such as RFRA) would make it very difficult
for the prosecution to prove the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.241
Moreover, both as a matter of fundamental fairness and in the
interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution
should be initiated against any person unless the attorney for the
government believes that the admissible evidence is sufficient to
obtain and sustain a guilty verdict by an unbiased trier of fact.242

2. The Justice Manual specifies that religious liberty concerns should
inform litigation strategy
More specifically regarding the broad first interpretation of the
harboring provision, the Justice Manual states that “to the greatest
extent practicable and permitted by law, Department components
and United States Attorneys’ Offices must reasonably
accommodate religious observance and practice in all activities,
including litigation.”243 The manual itself goes on to articulate the
strict scrutiny that RFRA requires:
RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially
burdening a person’s exercise of religion, unless the federal
government demonstrates that application of such burden to the
religious adherent is the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling governmental interest. RFRA applies to all actions by
federal administrative agencies, including rulemaking,
adjudication or other enforcement actions, and grant or contract
distribution and administration.244

This section of the manual further details the various ways
religious freedom under RFRA are to be accommodated. It also
provides for a point person to coordinate religious liberty issues in
litigation: “Each litigating division should select a member of its

241. See the Justice Manual guidance stating, “The attorney for the government should
commence or recommend federal prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct
constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to
obtain and sustain a conviction . . . .” Id. § 9-27.220.
242. Id.
243. Id. § 1-15.100.
244. Id. § 1-15.300.
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front office and each United States Attorney’s Office should assign
its Civil Chief, or his/her designee, to coordinate religious liberty
litigation issues and to implement this section.”245 Given this
guidance in the Justice Manual regarding the paramountcy of
religious liberty in informing litigation strategy generally, it follows
that prosecutors should use RFRA when exercising their judgment
in how broadly to construe the INA’s harboring provision. The
Attorney General noted this in his guidance memorandum on
interpreting religious liberty protections in federal law:
Much like administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking,
agencies considering potential enforcement actions should
consider whether such actions are consistent with federal
protections for religious liberty. In particular, agencies should
remember that RFRA applies to agency enforcement just as it
applies to every other governmental action. An agency should
consider RFRA when setting agency-wide enforcement rules and
priorities, as well as when making decisions to pursue or continue
any particular enforcement action . . . .246

Moreover, the DOJ made it plain in the memo that religious
liberty was to be respected at every level of the government’s
litigation strategy, including prosecutorial discretion.247
VII. CONCLUSION
The Trump administration’s “zero tolerance” policy towards
undocumented people has resulted in religiously motivated
resistance movements proliferating. Since President Trump has
been in office, the sanctuary movement alone has more than
doubled. Such religiously motivated resistance, however, has not
slowed the administration’s aggressive agenda to “take the
shackles off” ICE.248 In what has the potential to be a vicious cycle,
the more the administration cracks down on undocumented
people, the more the religiously motivated movement grows. And
the more the movement grows, the more the administration may
feel the need to crack down on the undocumented people.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. § 1-15.200.
Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jeff Sessions, supra note 3, at 8.
See generally id.
Miroff & Sacchetti, supra note 30.
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The state of the law regarding religiously motivated aid to
undocumented people, however, is unclear. Although recent years
have brought some clarity to a few circuits, federal courts remain
divided about how broadly to interpret the INA’s provision against
harboring undocumented people, even after employing the
standard tools of interpretation. In at least two circuits,249 the courts
interpreted the harboring provision to mean merely “substantially
facilitating” (or “to make easier or less difficult”) an undocumented
person’s stay in the United States. In at least three circuits,250 the
courts decided that harboring involves more than mere substantial
facilitation. These circuits require a specific intent to hide the
undocumented person from authorities, although not necessarily
in a clandestine manner. Lastly, in at least one circuit,251 the court
interpreted the harboring provision to mean more than
substantially facilitating, but not necessarily active hiding from
authorities. This view, as articulated by the Seventh Circuit, is that
harboring is conduct that substantially facilitates and that provides
a person “a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to be
seeking him.”252
It is not difficult to foresee a conflict between the ambiguous
harboring provision and a spectrum of religiously motivated
conduct toward undocumented people. As the first version of this
Article was being completed, Professor Scott Daniel Warren was
being indicted under § 1324 for “taking care” of two undocumented
men with food, water, and shelter because his religious beliefs
compelled him to help human beings in distress.253 The last time the
American legal system endured this significant of a clash between
a president’s immigration policies and religiously motivated
conduct towards undocumented people was in the 1980s. It was
resolved in a different religious liberty paradigm—pre-RFRA,
pre–O Centro, and pre–Hobby Lobby. Analysis under the new
religious liberty paradigm reveals a strong RFRA claim or defense

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Section II.A (specifically, the Eighth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits).
See supra Section II.B (specifically, the Second, Sixth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits).
See supra Section II.C (the Seventh Circuit).
United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Warren, No. CR 18-002233-TUC-RCC(BPV), 2018 WL 5257807 (D.
Ariz. May 31, 2018).
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to a broad interpretation of the harboring statute as conduct that
merely “substantially facilitates.”
A solution to this looming conflict between a broad
interpretation of the INA’s harboring provision and RFRA is for
RFRA to influence the statutory construction of the INA’s
harboring provision. Using RFRA as a tool of statutory construction
is consistent with the text of RFRA and is constitutionally permitted
in this instance. It may not be a technique that should be invoked
all the time, but there are good reasons for invoking it here over
RFRA’s traditional mechanism of case-by-case exemptions. First, it
is easier for the courts to administer than case-by-case
accommodations because it prevents an onslaught of litigation
from burdening the court system, which would likely require them
to delve into the nature of a defendant or claimant’s beliefs. Second,
it prevents the burden of litigation to religiously motivated
defendants. Third, another substantive canon of construction—the
rule of lenity—counsels in favor of a narrow construction and
courts are familiar with implementing it. Last, it avoids the
contention that arises from the more conventional case-by-case
exemption approach where the clash is not truly necessary.
The puzzle of how to resolve the interaction of RFRA and the
INA highlights a useful starting point for considering a range of
different legal tools available to both executive officials and courts
for operationalizing RFRA’s mandate and its interaction with other
federal statutes. The modest point of this Article is to show that (1)
if a federal statute remains ambiguous after employing traditional
rules of interpretation and (2) after scrutinizing each possible
interpretation of the ambiguous statute under RFRA’s strict
scrutiny test, one interpretation of the ambiguous statute creates a
viable RFRA claim or defense, and (3) there are prudential reasons
for mobilizing RFRA on a macro scale than case-by-case
exemptions, such as because a large amount of religiously
motivated people would be implicated and (4) the usual balance
with the Establishment Clause is not upset by mobilizing RFRA this
way, then (5) it behooves executive officials and courts, if necessary,
to invoke a RFRA-based statutory construction of the statute to
solve the RFRA problem.
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